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RETURNS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Prior research documented that U.S. stock prices tend to grow faster during 
Democratic administrations than during Republican administrations. This letter 
examines whether stock returns in other countries also depend on the political 
orientation of the incumbents. An analysis of 24 stock markets and 173 
different governments reveals that there are no statistically significant 
differences in returns between left-wing and right-wing executives. 
Consequently, international investment strategies based on the political 
orientation of countries’ leadership are likely to be futile. 
 
 
JEL classification: G11; G14; G15 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
An important question faced by every voter on the Election Day is which of the 
parties is best equipped to foster the development of economy and capital markets. 
In the pursuit of their own political agenda, the winning party or coalition can fine-tune 
the fiscal policy and significantly impact on the future economic outcomes. 
Depending on their political orientation, the objectives of different camps can be quite 
disparate. As suggested by the partisan theory of Hibbs (1977), left-wing 
governments tend to cater for the well-being of their working class electorate by 
targeting unemployment. Right-wing governments, on the other hand, prioritize 
reduction in inflation feared by the higher income and occupational status groups.  
 
Several earlier papers focused specifically on the relationship between 
political orientation of the executive branch of the government and the stock market 
performance. Johnson et al. (1999) and Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) report that 
U.S. stock market returns were higher under Democratic than Republican 
presidencies, with the difference being particularly large for small stock portfolios. 
This anomaly can not be explained away by variations in business cycle proxies. 
Huang (1985) and Hansel and Ziemba (1995) look at whether presidential trading 
strategies are able to improve investors’ risk-return trade-off. 
 
 Our paper adds to the presidential puzzle literature by extending the empirical 
analysis beyond the U.S. stock market. The dataset compiled for this study covers 24 
OECD countries and 173 different governments. Since elections are relatively 
infrequent, a multi-country approach allows increasing the number of observations 
and the power of statistical tests. Furthermore, it provides useful insights to 
international investors who wonder whether the conclusions obtained from the U.S. 
data can be generalized in a global context. 
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The remainder of this letter is organized as follows. The next section describes 
data sources and sample characteristics. Section III investigates the behavior of 
stock market indexes around the Election Day and throughout the tenure of different 
administrations. The implications for investors and conclusions are contained in the 
last section. 
 
II. DATA 
In order to investigate the nexus between political variables and stock returns the 
authors attempted to construct a comprehensive dataset including all OECD 
countries. Regrettably, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, South Korea, and 
Switzerland had to be excluded from the analysis because either MSCI did not 
provide data on stock market indexes for these capital markets, or there was not a 
single change in the orientation of the government throughout the period for which 
the index was available. The returns for the remaining 24 countries were computed 
using the U.S. dollar denominated, value-weighted, and dividend-adjusted MSCI 
Country Indices spanning a period from January 1980 through December 2005. 
Whenever daily data on MSCI index was not available from January 1980, the 
sample period was adjusted accordingly. The stock market data was sourced from 
Thomson Financial DataStream. This dataset has been previously used in Bialkowski 
et al. (2006).  
 
The prevailing political system in a given country (presidential or 
parliamentary) determines the relevant type of election that will be examined. 
Election dates as well as the exact start and end dates of each government’s term in 
office were obtained from Banks et al. (2004), Caramani (2000), Lane et al. (1991), 
Laver and Schofield (1998), and Müller and Strøm (2000). The classification of 
governments into left- and right-leaning administrations was taken from Alesina and 
Roubini (1992), Alt (1985), and Banks et al. (2004). Coalition governments were 
attributed to the political camp they are conventionally associated with. Table 1 
describes the characteristics of the political and financial variables used in this letter.  
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Country MSCI index starting date 
Number of 
left-wing 
governmen
ts 
Number of 
right-wing 
government
s 
Number of 
days left-wing 
government  
in office 
Number of days 
right-wing 
government  
in office 
Australia 1-Jan-80 5 6 4749 4382 
Austria 1-Jan-80 6 2 7339 1792 
Belgium 1-Jan-80 2 6 1999 7132 
Canada 1-Jan-80 5 3 5734 3397 
Czech Republic 30-Dec-94 2 2 2359 1295 
Denmark 1-Jan-80 5 6 4211 4920 
Finland 1-Jan-87 5 1 5126 1448 
France 1-Jan-80 4 4 5346 3785 
Germany 1-Jan-80 4 5 3261 5870 
Greece 1-Jun-01 1 1 1013 296 
Hungary 2-Jan-95 2 1 2230 1421 
Italy 1-Jan-80 6 3 7487 1644 
Japan 2-Jan-80 1 9 885 8245 
Mexico 1-Jan-88 3 1 4718 1491 
Netherlands 1-Jan-80 2 7 2891 6240 
New Zealand 2-Jan-87 4 3 3248 3325 
Norway 1-Jan-80 5 5 5029 4102 
Poland 1-Jan-93 2 2 2635 1747 
Portugal 4-Jan-88 2 3 2350 3856 
Spain 1-Jan-80 5 3 5161 3970 
Sweden 1-Jan-80 6 2 7021 2110 
Turkey 4-Jan-88 2 4 1407 4799 
United Kingdom 1-Jan-80 3 4 2800 6331 
United States 1-Jan-80 3 5 3307 5824 
Overall  85 88 92306 89422 
 
Table 1: Sample Description 
 
Note: The first column lists all of the 24 OECD countries included in the sample. The dates from which 
daily stock prices for the respective MSCI Country Indices became available in DataStream are shown 
in the second column. For any given country, the number of left-wing and right-wing governments that 
were in office between the index start date and the end of 2005 are indicated, as well as the overall 
number of days corresponding to the tenures of either political camp. 
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Over 60% of countries had daily MSCI index data available from January 
1980, whereas in the remaining cases the index starts at a later date. Among the 24 
nations, Denmark and Australia had the highest number of governments included 
and Greece had the lowest due to short index availability. The dataset covers a 
comparable number of 85 left-wing and 88 right-wing governments. Although the 
number of right-wing administrations was slightly higher, the left-wing governments 
had tenures that were on average 70 days longer. This translates into a longer 
overall term in office for the left camp.  
 
III. RESULTS 
Abnormal Returns around the Election Day  
One of the features of political systems is that elections do not necessarily coincide 
with an immediate change in the executive. For instance, the U.S. elections are 
always held on Tuesday following the first Monday of November, whereas the 
presidential term starts on the 20th of January the following year. This study 
investigates the relationship between politics and stock market by focusing both on 
the entire term of office and on the day on which voters cast their ballots.   
 
It is conceivable, that in the face of political changes investors adjust their 
required risk premium on assets. If they attribute greater uncertainty to the left of the 
political spectrum, the stock market will be expected to offer higher returns under left-
wing governments. These higher returns would be a form of compensation for the 
increased risk. In this scenario, however, stock prices on the Election Day are likely 
to plummet. This is an immediate consequence of the increased discount rate and 
the resultant lower present value of future cash flows of all firms. The story of 
changing risk premium is consistent with the previously discussed presidential puzzle 
and Riley and Luksetich (1980) findings showing the existence of negative returns 
around the Election Day for Democratic victories and positive returns for Republican 
wins. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Election Day 
Note: This figure depicts cumulative abnormal returns around the Election Day (Day 0) for right-wing 
and left-wing government wins. In instances where elections took place during the weekend Day 0 is 
defined as the first day of trading after the elections. The abnormal returns are calculated as the 
difference between the return on the MSCI Country Index and the MSCI World Index. The abnormal 
returns were subsequently averaged across all relevant events and cumulated over time to obtain the 
cumulative abnormal return.  
 
In its first step, this analysis examines international stock market patterns 
around Election Day using a simple event-study. The abnormal returns are defined 
as the difference between the returns on the MSCI Country Index and the MSCI 
World Index. Figure 1 depicts the cumulative abnormal returns separated by 
orientation of the election winner. The plots show no apparent market reaction 
around the day when the uncertainty about future political leadership is resolved. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for the right-wing and left-wing election winners oscillate 
within a narrow range and fail to reach statistical significance. Consequently, the 
conclusion that investors re-adjust their discount rates in response to election results 
is not supported by our data. It is also unlikely that highly profitable trading strategies 
based on the predictions of election outcomes can be designed.  
 
Returns during the Term of Office 
Having established that the announcement effect around elections is negligible, our 
focus turns to measuring stock market performance throughout different 
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incumbencies. Table 2 presents the dollar-denominated annualized returns 
corresponding to calendar years of tenure. The second column shows mean returns 
under left-wing rules and is juxtaposed with the third column which reports similar 
statistics for the right-wing governments. A bootstrap test based on 1,000 replications 
is used to verify whether the difference between these two columns is equal to zero.  
 
Returns [%] 
Country Left- 
Wing 
Right- 
Wing Difference 
Bootstrap 
p-value 
Australia 11.0897 2.0911 8.9986 0.1140 
Austria 4.5204 19.4968 -14.9764 0.0490** 
Belgium 2.3024 9.8324 -7.5300 0.2060 
Canada 5.6661 7.7861 -2.1200 0.3680 
Czech Republic 18.1543 -3.9685 22.1228 0.0730* 
Denmark -0.8029 13.3258 -14.1287 0.1090 
Finland 9.9560 12.9370 -2.9810 0.4440 
France 13.4530 1.5492 11.9038 0.0690* 
Germany -4.1297 14.1892 -18.3189 0.0160** 
Greece 3.1633 31.0425 -27.8792 0.1480 
Hungary 33.4150 -5.9310 39.3460 0.0190** 
Italy 10.9697 2.9079 8.0618 0.2260 
Japan 0.43515 7.9392 -7.5041 0.2690 
Mexico 20.1139 13.8611 6.2528 0.3610 
Netherlands 4.9962 11.1087 -6.1125 0.2330 
New Zealand -3.9651 3.0679 -7.0330 0.2460 
Norway 3.3169 9.9913 -6.6744 0.2020 
Poland 8.0489 28.1800 -20.1311 0.1690 
Portugal 4.5779 0.3350 4.2429 0.3320 
Spain 12.4139 3.0942 9.3197 0.1270 
Sweden 15.0895 9.7092 5.3803 0.3030 
Turkey 0.9501 8.2212 -7.2711 0.3670 
United Kingdom 3.1467 10.6031 -7.4564 0.1490 
United States 13.9556 6.2568 7.6988 0.1230 
Overall 8.6992 8.3588 0.3404 0.5580 
 
Table 2: Political Orientation of Government and Stock Market Returns 
Note: The first column lists all of the 24 countries included in our sample. The next two columns 
report annualized dollar-denominated average stock market returns during the tenure of left-wing and 
right-wing governments. Column 4 shows the difference between the two estimates. The last column 
lists the bootstrap p-values for the null hypotheses that the differences in column 4 equal zero. The 
bootstrap procedure was performed as follows. For a single bootstrap sample returns were drawn at 
random with replacement to match the number of days in office for the left-wing and right-wing 
governments in our original sample. Subsequently, the annualized average returns for both camps 
were computed and the difference was recorded. This procedure was repeated 1000 times to develop 
an empirical distribution for the difference under the null and the p-value was extracted from this 
distribution.  
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 According to Table 2 the Democrat premium in the U.S. is around 7.7% per 
annum, which is in line with the findings of previous studies using value-weighted 
index (see Huang (1985), Johnson et al. (1999) and Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
(2003)). The U.S. experience does not, however, generalize in the global context. A 
closer inspection reveals that 14 out of the 24 considered stock markets actually 
offered a right-wing government premium. Out of the 5 cases with bootstrap p-value 
below 10%, 2 favored right-wing governments and 3 favored the political left. Overall, 
the stock market returns were 34 basis points higher when the left-wing 
administrations were in power, but this result is not statistically significant. In light of 
these findings, international investors should exercise a great deal of caution 
whenever speculating on the orientation of the executive. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Several earlier papers noted that U.S. stock prices tend to grow faster when 
Democrats are in office. This anomaly persisted for almost a century and 
opportunities to exploit it in security trading were present. Since political orientation of 
the incumbent president is common knowledge, this result may prima facie appear to 
refute the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as an 
increased risk premium accruing to investors who decide to hold stocks throughout 
the tenure of left-wing administrations. If the latter explanation was correct, one 
would expect high returns during left-wing rules not only in the U.S., but also in other 
countries.  
 
To verify the abovementioned hypothesis, this study used a comprehensive database 
covering 24 OECD countries and 173 different governments. The results based on 
the international sample indicate that there are no statistically significant differences 
in returns between left-wing and right-wing governments neither in the election period 
nor throughout the tenure. The anomaly observed in the U.S. appears to be country-
specific and investors who diversify their portfolios internationally should be wary of 
allocating their money based solely on the political orientation of the countries’ 
leadership. 
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